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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this appeal by
virtue of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 2 6 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (See Appendix A ) ; and 78-2a3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (as amended) See Appendix A,

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issues presented on appeal of this matter are:
1.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the
verdict.

The standard of review is the marshalling of

the evidence rule as follows:
[A reviewing court must] view all the evidence and
inferences that may reasonably be drawn from it in
a light most favorable to the jury verdict, and
[the] verdict will be reversed only if evidence is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted. State v. Caver,
814 P.2d 604, 612 (Utah App. 1991). See also State
v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991).
2.

Whether the trial court denied defendant his rights to
confrontation, effective assistance of counsel and due
process of law guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
and Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah
Constitution by not providing defendant an interpreter.
The standard of review in Utah is an abuse of
discretion.
1950).

See State v. Truiillo, 214 P.2d 626 (Utah

It is important to note, however, that the

issue of whether provision of an interpreter is a
1

consitutional imperative has not as yet been addressed
by any reviewing court in this state and review is
timely.
3.

Whether defense counsel was ineffective in his
representation of the defendant.

The standard of

review is set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052, reh'g denied, 467
U.S. 1267, 82 L.Ed. 2d 864, 104 S.Ct. 3562, (1984) and
adopted by Utah in State v. Montes, 804 P.2d 543 (Utah
App. 1991) and reads as follows:
i)
The defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. See Appendix A. State v. Montes, 8 04 P.2d
543, 545 (Utah App. 1991); and
ii) The defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v.
Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App. 1991).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The following is a list of those constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules thought to be determinative.
of each provision is found in Appendix A.
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
United States Constitution, Amendment V
United States Constitution, Amendment VI
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7
2

A complete text

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14
Section 76-1-501(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
Section 76-6-602, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amendeded
Section 76-6-603, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
Section 77-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 4 02
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 602
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 901(a)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge on the
2nd day of January, 1992.

See Appendix Bl.

The case was tried

to the bench on the 10th day of March, 1992 and the defendant was
found guilty as charged.

See Appendix B5, B6, B7.

Defendant appeals his conviction of Retail Theft, a Class B
Misdemeanor on violation of Section 76-6-602, U.C.A 1953 (as
amended) (See Appendix A) and adopted by Orem City in Section 161-1 Orem City Code (as amended).

RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE
The defendant was tried and convicted by the bench on March
10, 1992 of Retail Theft of a package of two video tapes from KMart, 47 5 North State, Orem after having pled not-guilty on

January 2, 1992.

See Appendix B.

Lish in the criminal trial.

He was represented by Randy

See Appendix B.

On December 22,

1991 the defendant purchased a blank Sony 8mm video tape from KMart located in Orem, Utah.

The following day, December 23,

1991, Mr. Lee returned to K-mart.

R. at 2 and 21.

His intention

was to return the video tape, purchased the previous day, and to
purchase a caulking gun.

R. at 21.

for the video tape with him.

He took his sales receipt

R. at 21.

As he approached the

service desk to return the tape, the lines were extremely long as
is usual for December 2 3 and the holiday season.

R. at 21.

Mr.

Lee was in a hurry and became discouraged with the time it would
take to return the tape and proceeded to purchase the caulking
gun.

R. at 21 and 24.

He put the video tape back in the pocket

of his coat and the receipt in his shirt pocket and went to
purchase the caulking gun.

R. at 22.

Before he picked up the

caulking gun he removed the tape from his pocket and placed it
back in the K-Mart sack it had been in before standing in line at
the service counter.
the caulking gun.

Mr. Lee was stopped after he had purchased

R. at 5.

Mr. Lee was then compelled by K-Mart

security to make incriminating statements, was detained for
greater than a reasonable time, and threatened in a manner
inconsistent with state law and constitutional guarantees.
5-7 and 14-16.

R. at

No pre-trial motions were made to challenge the

propriety of these actions.

See Appendix B for court minute

entries absent any setting for hearing of pre-trial motions.
Evidence was admitted during the trial without foundation and
4

counsel for the defendant offered no objection, further
prejudicing Mr. Lee,

R. at 9.

Moreover, Mr. Lee is a native of Taiwan.

Although he has

lived in the United States for a number of years, Mr. Lee has
only limited ability to communicate in English.

R. at 20-28.

It

is difficult for him to understand others and even more difficult
for others to understand him.

R. at 2 0-28.

Consequently, Mr Lee

neither made the Court understand critical testimony nor
understood the testimony presented.

R. at 2 0-2 8.

Counsel for

defendant neither requested an interpreter nor did the Court
inquire into the necessity.

See Appendix B for minute entries

showing no request or inquiry.

Consequently, Mr. Lee was denied

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
In addition, evidence was presented that indicated K-Mart
had not inventoried stock to determine whether a package of tapes
had actually been missing on that day.

R. at 17-2 0.

Without

such proof, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
conviction.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant asserts that the verdict is not justified.
Defendant contends that the City of Orem failed to satisfy the
requirement that each element of the crime be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. The prosecution never produced evidence that
the item allegedly stolen by defendant was ever missing from the
inventory of the merchant.

Rather, it was shown that no inquiry
5

of inventory was ever made.

Consequently, the evidence was not

sufficient to convict defendant.

Defendant further believes that

his case was prejudiced by the absence of an interpreter to
assist the court in understanding his testimony and to allow
defendant to assist in his own defense and understand the
procedure in which he was involved.

Finally, he believes he was

convicted as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel,
defense counsel never filed suppression motions; nor did he
request translation assistance; nor did he make adequate
objections to admissions of evidence; nor did defense counsel
request that an inventory of the videotapes be conducted to
establish that videotapes were not stolen.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE GUILTY VERDICT
A.
Applying the Standard of Review for Marshalling of the
Evidence in the Light Most Favorable to the Verdict, the
Prosecution Failed to Establish Defendant's Guilt Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt.
Since 1985, the Utah Appellate Court's standard of review

for a claim of insufficiency of evidence has been the marshalling
of evidence rule.

The Utah Court of Appeals held that in order

to reverse a criminal conviction on the basis of insufficiency of
the evidence, the reviewing court must:
view all the evidence and inferences that may reasonably be
drawn from it in a light most favorable to the jury verdict,
and [the] verdict will be reversed only if evidence is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that defendant committed the crime of which he was
6

convicted. State v. Caver, 814 P.2d 604, 612 (Utah App.
1991).
This standard has been adopted and applied by this court in
numerous other cases.

See State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah

App. 1991); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990); State
v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1990); [citing State
v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)];
Bolsinaer, 699

P.2d 1214, 1218 (Utah 1985).

State v.
The marshalling

requirement has also been applied to criminal bench trials by the
Utah Supreme Court. State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah
1990).
Complying with the marshalling of the evidence rule, the
record shows that:
1.

The defendant was in K-Mart in Orem on or about December 23,

1991.
2.

R. at 2.
At one point during his visit to K-Mart Mr. Lee was observed

with a package of tapes in his hands.
3.

Mr. Lee was observed later with a "crinkled up K-Mart bag"

and a caulking gun in his hands.
4.

R. at 4.

Mr. Lee was stopped after going through the checkstand,

having payed only for a caulking gun.
5.

R. at 4.

R. at 5.

Mr. Lee gave some statement to store security, the content

of which is not entirely clear, but which security construed as
an admission that he put the tapes into a bag.

R. at 7.

In addition, the record also shows that:
1.

At no time was Mr. Lee observed putting the tapes in his

pocket.

R. at 10.
7

2.

The tapes were admitted into evidence based upon an improper

foundation,
3.

R. at 9.

The security officer was not in constant visual contact with

Mr. Lee during this episode.
4.

R. at 12.

Security testified that inventory control was available but

that she couldn't check because she couldn't leave the suspect.
R. at 18.

However, it is also clear that she never checked the

inventory to determine whether the tapes were in fact stolen
despite an opportunity during the period of detention or the
three months between the arrest and trial.
5.

R. at 19.

Mr. Lee had explanations for many of the allegations but was

unable to communicate effectively. Thus neither his side of the
story nor his evidence was ever actually considered.

R. at 2 0-

28.
6.

Mr. Lee stated he had a receipt for the allegedly stolen

items, the receipt was never offered nor admitted into evidence
and consequently, never considered by the court.
As listed above, incongruities are apparent when an attempt
is made to marshall the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict.

Reasonable minds could easily differ when

confronted with such conflicting evidence.

Therefore, the

evidence is not conclusive to the verdict.

Rather, it creates a

reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.

8

B.
The City of Orem Failed to Satisfy the Requirement that
the Crime be Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Because the
City has Never Shown by Investigating the Stored Videotape
Inventory that the Videotapes were Stolen
Section 76-1-501(1) of the Utah Code Annotated requires that
elements of a crime be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that
a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed
to be innocent until each element of the offense
charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall
be acquitted. 76-1-501(1) U.C.A. 1953 (as amended).
Consequently, the burden falls upon the prosecution to prove
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Absent such a

showing, the defendant should be acquitted.
The Utah Court of Appeals has addressed the scope of the
reasonable doubt standard.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt... is a doubt that is
based on reason, ... one which is reasonable in view of
all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not
a doubt which is based on a wholly speculative
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that
degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it and obviates all reasonable
doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable
men and women would entertain and it must arise from
the evidence or ... lack of evidence...State v. Perdue,
813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991) (footnote 1 ) .
Based upon this interpretation, it is apparent that
reasonable doubt is not a low threshold that prosecution may
easily reach; rather, the prosecution has a significant burden.
The prosecution in this case did not meet its burden of proof to
establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
9

The

videotapes in the store were never inventoried to determine if
any were missing.

Testimony presented at trial showed there was

an opportunity and a method by which an inventory check could
have been conducted,

R. at 17-19•

Although the store may not

have been able to determine if these exact tapes were stolen, it
could have determined if any tapes were missing from inventory,
suggesting that it was at least probable or improbable that this
particular brand and type of tape had unaccounted packages
missing from inventory.

Further testimony showed the inventory

check was not made simply because it was not routinely conducted
at the time of the alleged theft and was burdensome to the
employee.

It was never determined that a later check would have

effectively ruled out the possibility of theft.

Nor should the

burden upon the store be the overriding concern when it is
charging an individual with a crime and when a possible means of
verifying the validity of the criminal charge is at hand.
This raises the question as to whether there was a retail
theft at all?

Further, Mr. Lee had a receipt for the merchandise

which was never considered by the store or the court.

It was

never conclusively shown that the videotapes improperly admitted
as evidence were actually stolen.

Therefore, reasonable minds

would have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted.

By the exact

definition of Section 76-1-501(1) Utah Code Annotated, defendant
is innocent because he was not proven guilty. The verdict should
be overturned.
10

II.

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution in

pertinent part reads,

tf

[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused

shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf."
This Utah constitutional guarantee was also codified in 77-1-6,
U.C.A. 1953 (as amended).

See Appendix A.

Defendant was denied due process of law, his right to
confrontation, and effective assistance of counsel when his case
proceeded without an interpreter, as discussed in the following
subsections:
A.
The Trial Court Denied Defendant His Rights to
Confrontation/ Effective Assistance of Counsel and Due
Process of Law Guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution by Not Providing
Defendant an Interpreter. (See Appendix A ) .
Foreign nationals enjoy the same rights afforded citizens
accused of a crime under the Constitution. Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 (1952). However, several of these
rights cannot be preserved without the assistance of an
interpreter when a defendant cannot speak or understand English.
Among these rights are the right to counsel, United States ex
rel. Negron v. New York, 310 F.Supp. 1304, 1308 (E.D.N.Y.1970),
aff'd, 434 F.2d. 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970); the right to confront
adverse witnesses, United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st
Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 907, 40 L.Ed. 112, 94 S.Ct.
1613 (1974) ; the right to cross-examine those witnesses, and the
11

right to be present and participate at one's own trial. Negron,
434 F.2d at 380-90; Carrion, 488 F.2d at 14.

Any prosecution of

these defendants without an interpreter is constitutionally
unsound and constitutionally unfair.

The Constitutional

guarantees afforded criminal defendants, therefore, require that
an interpreter be appointed for them.
The case before the court involves a two-fold inadequacy.
First Mr. Lee was unable to effectively understand what was
happening around him.

He could not contribute and assist in his

own defense nor understand those giving evidence against him.
Second, he could not make himself understood by the court and his
counsel and therefore, could not provide evidence of what he
believed the facts to be.

Clearly under this handicap, the court

ruled after receiving only part of the story.
In 1991, the Colorado Appellate Court ruled that although
the non-English speaking defendant was present during the closing
arguments and the reading of the jury instructions, the absence
of an interpreter was equivalent to defendant not being present
at all.

People v. Luu, 813 P.2d 826; Cf. People v. Avila, 797

P.2d 804 (Colo. App. 1990).
While many states and Circuits have held the appointment of
an interpreter within the discretion of the trial court judge,
See Vallardes v. U.S., 871 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1989); State v.
Truiillo, 214 P.2d 626 (Utah 1950), there is also strong and
persuasive language that discretion must be tempered "with reason
and concern for the rights of the defendant seeking the
12

assistance of an interpreter."
F.Supp. 504 (M.D.Fla. 1989).

Giraldo-Rincon v. Dugger, 707
The court in Giraldo-Rincon further

held
Considerations of fairness, the integrity of the factfinding process and the potency of our adversary system
of justice forbid that the state should prosecute a
defendant who is not present at his own trial (cites
omitted) unless by his conduct he waives that right,
(cites omitted). And it is equally imperative that
every criminal defendant — if the right to be present
is to have meaning — possess 'sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding.' (cites omitted).
Otherwise, '[t]he adjudication loses its character as a
reasoned interaction...and becomes an invective against
an insensible object.' (cite omitted). Giraldo-Rincon
supra at 507 quoting United States of America v. The
State of New York, 310 F.Supp. 1304 (E.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2nd Cir.1970).
Other courts have held that although the appointment of an
interpreter may be discretionary, there is an implied duty to
inquire as to the necessity of interpretation assistance.

United

State v. Carrion. 488 F.2d 12 (1973), cert denied 416 U.S. 907,
40 L.Ed. 112, 94 S.Ct. 1613 (1974) (trial court duty to inquire
was satisfied where court specifically asked counsel if defendant
was able to understand English and to which counsel replied in
the affirmative); People v. Rivera, 300 N.E.2d 869 (111. 1973)
(under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, a trial judge has a duty to appoint an interpreter
sua sponte and at any stage of the proceeding if the necessity in
order to enable the defendant to participate in the process
becomes manifest to the court);

State v. Neave, 344 N.W.2d 181

(Wis. 1984) (with due regard for the right of a criminal
defendant, who did not understand English, the services of an
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interpreter requires that when the court is on notice of a
language difficulty, the court is required to make a factual
determination as to whether the disability is sufficient so as to
prevent the defendant from communicating or understanding).
In this case Mr. Lee's inability to communicate and
understand became manifest to the trial court and it was on
notice simply by his courtroom demeanor and lack of ability to
respond and be understood.

At any rate any problems could have

been resolved with a few short questions from the bench.
The key is that an inquiry has to be made.

Utah is as yet

silent on the issue of whether the right to an interpreter is a
constitutional imperative.

However, if the right to

confrontation, effective assistance of counsel and to be present
at one's own criminal proceeding, as guaranteed by the Utah
Constitution, is to have any value at all the trial judge must be
held to some measure of inquiry to ensure the validity of the
proceeding.

One court has said that "[a] common test on

appellate review of whether a trial court erred in declining to
appoint an interpreter is whether or not such failure hampered
the defendant in any manner in presenting his case fairly to the
jury."

State v. Van Pham, 675 P.2d 848, 860 (Kan. 1984)

(emphasis added).

See also Viliborghi v. State of Arizona, 45

Ariz. 275, 283, 43 P.2d 210 (1935).
The record in this case is replete with "inaudible" as the
transcriber struggled with understanding the testimony of Mr.
Lee.

The defendant, struggling with trying to make himself
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understood, tried to enhance his communications skills with
motions and mannerisms which the court ordered him to stop.
at 22.

R.

Clearly, Mr. Lee was hampered in presenting his case

fairly to the fact finder and from understanding the proceedings
sufficiently to assist counsel while the trial was in progress.
Furthermore, defendant's right to due process of law as
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment (See Appendix A) was violated
in that he was denied the right to be confronted by the evidence
that eventually convicted him.

Mr. Lee had a plausible

explanation for the misunderstanding.

He went to K-Mart to

return tapes and buy a caulking gun.

As he was waiting for a

service manager he removed the tapes from the paper bag, wadded
up the bag and placed it in his coat pocket and waited patiently
for a refund on the merchandise with the tape package and the
receipt in his hand.

After a long wait (it was December 23) and

fearing he would miss a flight he was hurrying to catch he
decided to return the tapes later when it wasn't so busy.

He put

the tapes in his coat pocket and the receipt in his pocket as is
his custom when he is shopping.

He wanted to purchase a caulking

gun and on the way he noticed a sale on tapes.

He was curious to

see if the sale price was as good as the price he had paid for
similar tapes elsewhere and he had to look carefully to determine
that they were the proper brand and specification.

As he looked

at the tapes he remembered the ones he had slipped into his
pocket at the service counter and, trying to avoid an incident,
15

took the package out of his pocket and replaced it in the
crinkled K-Mart bag, then replaced the bag in his pocket and took
the caulking gun to the front to purchase it.
After he paid for the gun, he was stopped by security and
during the ensuing interrogation it became apparent that his
inability to communicate had become a disability.

He was late

for a flight and simply did not want complications.

Further,

even though he may not have understood all of the words used by
the security personnel, he soon realized the intent and was
embarrassed.

Believing he had done nothing wrong, he tried to

leave at which time he was physically restrained by store
personnel.

He was made to believe by the security person, Ms.

Callahan that if he walked to the back of the store with them,
they would talk to him briefly and allow him to be on his way
with no further embarrassment.

However, nothing could have been

further from the truth.
The security personnel only wanted to coerce a statement to
aid in Mr. Lee's arrest and conviction.

Mr. Lee did not

understand and K-Mart personnel took advantage of the language
disability.
the bag.

They wanted him to admit that he put the tapes in

That presented no problem to Mr. Lee.

own tapes into a bag he had brought with him.

He had put his

He did not

understand that his innocent statement would be misconstrued to
become an admission of guilt.
Even though this represents a plausible alternative to the
version presented by K-Mart and the City of Orem, little of it
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was brought out at trial because Mr. Lee was unable to make
himself understood.

Indeed, it was as though counsel and the

court simply tired of trying to understand him and elected to
give preference to the prosecution witnesses' version because it
was easier.

Consequently, it was as though he was absent from

the hearing and was convicted without even being involved in his
own trial.

He was therefore, denied due process of law.

B.
Defendant was Prejudiced in His Defense by the Lack of
an Interpreter, Robbing Him of His Right to Assist in His
Own Defense and To Understand the Procedure in Which He was
Involved,
Although this is a case governed by state law, Utah has no
specific statutory provision relative to the right of a person to
an interpreter.

It is helpful in the absence of state

legislative guidance, to look to the federal law.

The federal

Court Interpreters Act places a mandatory duty on the trial court
to inquire as to the need for an interpreter when the defendant
has difficulty with English. 28 U.S.C. § 1827; Vallardes v. U.S.,
871 F.2d 1564 (Ga. 1989).

For example, the 8th Circuit Court of

Appeals in U.S. v. Galleaos-Torres, 841 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1988),
held that because the defendant had answered affirmatively to the
district court's query of his English skills, there was no
violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial.

However, the

court emphasized that had the District Court failed in making
this inquiry, the District Court would have been in error for
failure to appoint sua sponte an interpreter for a defendant with
English-speaking difficulties.

Although, the appointment of an
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interpreter is at the discretion of the Court, Castellon v.
Whitley, 739 F.Supp. 526 (D.Nev. 1990), the Court must
nevertheless make the necessary inquiry.

In the case at bar,

neither counsel nor the trial judge inquired of the defendant's
English-speaking abilities, at any time during the proceedings.
This subsequently disabled the defendant, making him unable to
assist in his own defense, unable to understand the procedure in
which he was involved and detrimentally prejudiced defendant's
case.

Moreover, it was especially harmful to defendant's case as

he was a foreigner in an unfamiliar judicial system.
In addition, defendant's attempts to communicate with hand
gestures to express himself were curbed by direct order from the
judge.

R. at 22.

The transcript records "inaudible" responses

as well as numerous requests from defendant for questions to be
repeated that explicitly indicate defendant's limited ability to
communicate in English.

This point is further emphasized by

defendant's stilted remarks, grammatical and semantic errors.
Defendant in this case was subjected to trial without the
effective assistance of counsel, without the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses and was without the right to
be present and participate in his own trial because he was denied
his constitutional right to an interpreter.

Defendant could

neither effectively communicate in English nor adequately
function in an unfamiliar judicial system.

Consequently, the

absence of an interpreter was equivalent to defendant not being
present. Therefore, defendant was considerably disadvantaged in
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his own defense and failure of the trial judge to inquire as to
defendant's need for an interpreter constituted an abuse of
discretion.

III. DEFENDANTS COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN HIS REPRESENTATION OF
THE DEFENDANT.
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, reh'g
denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 82 L.Ed. 2d 864, 104 S.Ct. 3562, (1984)
established the standard of review for a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.

This two-prong standard is:

i)
The defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the "counsel11 guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. See Appendix A. State v. Montes, 804 P. 2d
543, 545 (Utah App. 1991); and
ii) The defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v.
Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App. 1991).
As the following subsections will show defense counsel in
this case was ineffective because he never challenged the
detention by store personnel; he failed to request an interpreter
in the face of overwhelming need; he failed to make adequate
objections to inadmissible evidence; and he failed to admit
potentially exculpatory evidence on behalf of defendant.
A.
Defense Counsel Never Challenged the Propriety of Mr.
Lee's Detention by Persons in Authority at the Site of the
Alleged Offense.
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Defense counsel never filed a motion to challenge the
detention by security personnel at the store nor did counsel
object or question the witnesses as to the detention procedure
employed.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution says:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. United States Constitution,
Amendment IV (See Appendix A ) .
Of greater importance, the Utah Constitution mirrors the
provisions found in the federal law. See Utah Constitution,
Article I, Section 14.

(See Appendix A ) .

Under usual circumstances, therefore, the Fourth Amendment
and the similar state guarantee do not apply to situation wherein
the person questioning or detaining is not part of the government
or its agent.

The Fourth Amendment is specifically directed to

governmental entities.

However, even private parties must

confine their actions in detaining a suspected offender to what
is reasonable.
The Utah Retail Theft Act provides:
Any merchant who has probable cause to believe that a
person has committed retail theft may detain such
person, on or off the premises of a retail mercantile
establishment, in a reasonable manner and for a
reasonable length of time for all or any of the
following purposes:
(1) To make reasonable inquiry as to whether such
person has in his possession unpurchased
merchandise and to make reasonable investigation
of the ownership of such merchandise;
(2) To request identification;
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(3) To verify such identification;
(4) To make a reasonable request of such person
to place or keep in full view any merchandise such
individual may have removed, or which the merchant
has reason to believe he may have removed, from
its place of display or elsewhere, whether for
examination, purchase or for any other reason;
(5) To inform a peace officer of the detention of
the person and surrender that person to the
custody of a peace officer;... U.C.A. 76-6-603
(1953, as amended).
Clearly K-Mart had the authority to detain Mr. Lee to
investigate the offense it reasonably believed had taken place.
The question then becomes whether the methods used to
interrogate, the length of the detention and the scope and manner
of the detention were "reasonable" as required by the statute.
In this case, Mr. Lee was physically compelled to submit to
the detention.

In the words of David Ferman, "I was solely

concerned and concentrating on trying to subdue the witness or
the defendant, and get him back to the security office, away from
the customers."

R. at 14.

Mr. Ferman testified that he "...sat

him [Mr. Lee] down and tried to start the paperwork..."
14.

R. at

"After several times of putting him back into the seat and

after continually trying to calm him down and talk to him, to
fill out the paperwork...we just decided to call the police..."
R. at 14.

Finally, Mr. Ferman testified he observed little

because "...I was concerned mostly with just keeping the
defendant in his chair and protecting the security officer."
at 15.

21

R.

All of these statements speak to the force, the coercion,
employed to compel Mr, Lee to remain and "fill out the
paperwork."
In addition, Ms, Callahan, in her trial testimony, alluded
to deceptive promises she made to Mr, Lee,

Mr, Lee is from a

culture, Taiwan, that places great emphasis on honor.

He was

embarrassed by this incident; he understood only by the physical
compulsion not the words that allegations were being made against
him and he was embarrassed by the commotion.

He tried to leave

to end the humiliation.
K-Mart personnel took advantage of Mr. Lee's lack of
communicative skills and induced him into statements they then
misconstrued as admission.

By Ms. Callahan's own testimony she

promised some kind of concession in exchange for cooperation,
"...and he kept trying to say, you know if I do this will you let
me go and I-I basically told him that we needed to do the
paperwork and then we would talk.

If he would come back, and we

would take care of things that we needed to take care of."
6.

R. at

(Emphasis added).
Important to note is that Ms. Callahan said he kept "trying

to say" as though she recognized his inability to effectively
communicate.

Secondly, in light of this inability, Ms.

Callahan's promises induced Mr. Lee to make statements and act in
a way he wouldn't have acted absent coercion. Failure to
challenge the detention constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel.
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Further, no evidence was even elicited from Mr. Lee or any
other witness on cross examination regarding the conditions of
the detention, the amount of time he was detained, the extent and
type of force used by store personnel.

Failure to determine

these factors constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel
In State v. Watts, the Utah Supreme Court addressed many of
the issues presented in this appeal.

In that case, the court

reviewed the application of the detention provision of the Retail
Theft Act.

As a preliminary matter, the court held that

ff

[i]n

order for a confession to be admissible, it must be made freely
and voluntarily; it must not be extracted by threats or violence
or obtained by improper influence or promises."
639 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah, 1981).
conviction.

State v. Watts,

In Watts, the court upheld the

However, the two cases may be distinguished.

First,

in Watts, evidence of the defendant's statements was admitted
after a proper challenge and hearing on admissibility.
not the case in this matter.

Such was

Mr. Lee never had an opportunity to

have the admissibility reviewed because no motion to bring it
before the court was made.

See State v. Allen, 505 P.2d 3 02

(Utah, 1973) .
Further, when introduced in court, defense counsel did not
even offer the appropriate objection.

The second distinguishing

factor is that in Watts, the confession was made only after the
inducement to confess had been withdrawn.

Watts 505 P.2d at 160.

In this case inducements were made at the outset and throughout
the incident.

Third, in Watts, the detaining agent was not
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considered a "person in authority".

He was the store manager.

In the case at bar, Mr. Lee was detained by security personnel
hired specifically for this purpose, vested with the authority to
act as though they were police officers and trained in obtaining
legally admissible evidence with an eye toward testimony and
conviction.

Clearly, these security officers were in a position

of authority.
Had evidence obtained as a result of this detention and
interrogation been reviewed prior to trial as should have been
done, this court would apply a totality of the circumstances
standard to review findings of the trial court.
607 P.2d 297 (Utah 1980).

State v. Hunt,

Using that standard in this instance,

clearly the totality of the circumstance shows that the detention
would bear a challenge at the very least.
challenge was made.

Even so, no such

Failure to pursue this avenue is ineffective

assistance of counsel.
In addition, defendant had significant constitutional rights
impaired when he was forcibly restrained from leaving the store
and coerced into making a written statement by his detainers.
Mr. Lee was confused and unfamiliar with the social and
legal system of the store.

He was under the impression he would

be allowed to leave if he wrote a statement and he was forcibly
placed and kept in a chair in a security office when he had only
come to the store to return a packet of videotapes that he didn't
want.

Under this pressure, he took the only alternative

available to him.

He signed a statement under the assumption
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that he would be released because that was what was asked of him.
Finally, the only legible words from his statement are, "put
tapes in bag" R. at 7.

This statement never indicated that these

tapes were taken from the shelf and put in a bag.

Rather, he

could have been expressing the fact that the tapes were removed
from his coat pocket and put into a bag to be returned to the
store.

Even though the issues present unanswerable questions to

the court they could have been addressed and resolved at trial.
Failure to recognize or attempt resolution constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel.
B.
Defense Counsel Failed to Request a Translator for
Defendant, thus Depriving Defendant of a Fair Trial.
Defense counsel was retained to represent the best interests
of his client and to ensure that defendant received a fair trial.
By not requesting a translator for defendant, defendant was
denied a fair trial.

Admittedly, the trial court had discretion

to appoint an interpreter.

However, when an inquiry was not made

by the court as to defendant's English abilities, defense counsel
had a responsibility to move the court to provide his client with
translation assistance.
C
Defense Counsel Failed to Make Adequate Objections to
Admissions of Evidence.
The videotapes were admitted with no foundation, with no
chain of evidence established and with no objection to either
shortcoming.

No testimony was elicited that would show that the

package of tapes admitted were in fact the ones confiscated on
25

the date Mr, Lee was detained.

There was no testimony as to

distinguishing marks or anything to show it wasn't taken off the
shelf at some time after the incident.
At one point in the proceeding, the prosecution had turned
examination of Ms, Callahan over to defense counsel.

Defense

counsel had begun cross examination when the prosecution
interrupted, had the evidence marked and entered with no
foundation and no objection.

R. at 9.

It is petitioner's

position that such oversights were prejudicial to the defendant's
case but even if this court finds it less than critical, it is
still a measure of the deficient representation that defendant
had.
Additionally, even though the prosecution had failed to show
evidence that the tapes in question were ever really taken from
K-Mart, and had therefore, failed to prove the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, no motion to dismiss was made at
the conclusion of the City's evidence.
Defense counsel should have objected to the videotapes being
entered as evidence.

Without proper foundation, the evidence is

neither relevant, Utah Rules of Evidence, 401 and 402, nor
competent, Utah Rules of Evidence 901.

See Appendix A.

The

videotapes were assumed stolen in the absence of direct evidence.
Furthermore, defense counsel should have objected to the
written statement inferring that defendant had taken the
videotapes off the shelf and "put in bag" R. at 7.

Defense

counsel could and should have objected on the grounds of lack of
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personal knowledge, Utah Rules of Evidence 602 , or lack of
foundation, Utah Rules of evidence 401, 402 and 901.

See

Appendix A.
D.
Defense Counsel Failed to Admit Critical Evidence
Supporting Defendant's Case and Establishing a Defense.
Defendant was in the store to return the unwanted videotapes
he had purchased the previous day. He had in his possession the
receipt for the videotapes he had purchased in addition to the KMart bag in which he had received his purchase.

Defense counsel

negligently failed to enter these items as evidence to confirm
defendant's innocence.

E.
The Oversights and Omissions Referred to are Critical
and Determinative.
Clearly defense counsel's performance was deficient.

By

allowing inadmissible evidence before the fact finder with no
Motion to Suppress or objection; by failing to challenge
foundations and coerced statements; by failing to address the
propriety of the detention of the merchant's agents, counsel put
the defendant in the position of having no counsel at all, a
violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and of Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution.

See Appendix A.

Further the oversights and errors clearly prejudiced the
defense.

The admission of non-admissible evidence with no

objection and no record along with failure to move to dismiss
deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
27

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 490, provides the
defendant must point to specific instances in the record which,
under the circumstances, show that counsel's performance was
deficient.

Having so shown in this case,

ff

[t]he right to

effective assistance of counsel is so basic to a fair trial that
[its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error." State
v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991) , citing to Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1181 (1978).

Based

on the foregoing, defendant's counsel was so deficient that
defendant was deprived of a fair trial and it was as though he
had no counsel at all.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, even in the light most favorable to the
verdict under the marshalling of the evidence rule, the verdict
is unjustified.

The prosecution failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt defendant's guilt in that the evidence was
inconclusive and highly speculative. Thus, by the exact
definition of Section 76-1-501(1) Utah Code Annotated, defendant
is innocent.

Further, the defendant's case was prejudiced by the

absence of an interpreter and he was convicted as a result of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

For these reasons, the

judgement of the Trial Court of the Fourth Circuit, Orem
Department, must be overturned.
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APPENDIX A

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(In applicable parts)
AMENDMENT IV;

(Unreasonable searches and seizures)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V;

(Criminal actions — provisions concerning — Due
process of law and just compensation clauses)

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, with due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI:

(Rights of accused)

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall be committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defense.
AMENDMENT XIV; (Citizenship - Due Process of law - Equal
protection)
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
Al

of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.

CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
(In applicable parts)
Article I; Section 7;

Due Process of Law

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Article I; Section 12;

Rights of accused persons

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to be committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Article I, Section 14;

Unreasonable searches forbidden
Issuance of Warrant

—

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(In applicable parts)
Section 76-1-501
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
innocent until each element of the offense charged against
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of
such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
A2

(2) As used in this part the words "elements of the offense
mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results
of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the
definition of the offense; or
(b) The culpable mental state;
Section 76-6-602
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he
knowingly:
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers
or causes to be carried away or transferred, any merchandise
displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail
mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining
such merchandise or with the intention of depriving the
merchant permanently of the possession, use or benefit of
such merchandise without paying the retail value of such
merchandise; or
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price tag,
marking, indicia of value or any other markings which aid in
determining value of any merchandise displayed, held, stored
or offered for sale, in a retail mercantile establishment
and attempts to purchase such merchandise personally or in
consort with another at less than the retail value with the
intention of depriving the merchant of the retail value of
such merchandise; or
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed, held stored or
offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment from
the container with the intention of depriving the merchant
of the retail value of such merchandise; or
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving the
merchant of the retail value of the merchandise; or
(5) Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a retail
mercantile establishment with the intent of depriving the
merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart.
Section 76-6-603
Any merchant who has probable cause to believe that a person
has committed retail theft may detain such person, on or off the
premises of a retail mercantile establishment, in a reasonable
manner and for a reasonable length of time for all or any of the
following purposes:
(1) To make reasonable inquiry as to whether such person
has in his possession unpurchased merchandise and to make
reasonable investigation of the ownership of such

merchandise;
(2)
(3)

To request identification;
To verify such identification;
A3

(4) To make a reasonable request of such person to place or
keep in full view any merchandise such individual may have
removed, or which the merchant has reason to believe he may
have removed, from its place of display or elsewhere,
whether for examination, purchase or for any other
reasonable purpose;
(5) To inform a pease officer of the detention of the
person and surrender that person to the custody of a peace
officer;
(6) In the case of a minor, to inform a peace officer, the
parents, guardian or other private person interested in the
welfare of that minor immediately, if possible, of this
detention and to surrender custody of such minor to such
person,
A merchant may make a detention as permitted herein off the
premises of a retail mercantile establishment only if such
detention is pursuant to an immediate pursuit of such person•

Section 77-1-6:
(1)

Rights of defendant

In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

(2)

To
To
To
To
To

appear in person and defend in person by counsel;
receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
testify in his own behalf;
be controlled by the witnesses against him;
have compulsory process to insure the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf;
To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district where the offense is alleged to have
been committed;
To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of
law, to be entitled to a trial within 3 0 days after
arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business
of the court permits
(omitted)

Section 78-2a-3(2)(d)
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from
the small claims department of a circuit court;
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 4 01;

Definition of "relevant evidence"

"Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402;
Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant
evidence inadmissible
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or
by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 602;

Lack of personal knowledge

A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is
introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal
knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge
may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness
himself. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703,
relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.

Rule 901(a); Reguirement of authentication or identification
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication
or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims.
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APPENDIX B

?d

/ify,
ITY/STATE VS.
Defendant
OUNTER
{Hearing
kddress

0

FH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF I
H
UI AH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMEN.
97 East Center Street, Orem, Utah
(801)226-6823

Case/#

faJtltiA Q3L

/o^/

0OO2*> Date /-2-9 z

Judge
^7'JT^ ^
t
Tape Number ^ c ^ ~ / ' ~

Aa

Charge # 1 .
Charge # 2 .
Charge # 3 .

Clerk
^ .
Counter Numbe

& * > . & .

urrent address has been verified with defendant
Defendant appeared • Defendant failed to appear • Defendant in custody
BAA/ issued • Bail $
• Non-bailable • Plus $85.00 BW fee
Forfeit bail/bond
Clerk to renotice D Plaintiff to issue summons
Defendant given copy of information
nbrmation read /uQfefendant advised to rights
penalties expiainea^S^Defendant acknowledged (s)he understands rights, charge(s), penalties
Defendant was given ^ n d and 3rd offense warning in open court.
•

Defense Attorney
Prosecutor
• Request for counsel: • Granted D Denied
D Court appointed attorney: Contact
City/Randy Lish - 930 South State, #10, Orem 224-2119

•
D State
• PLEA:

Defendant Pro Se

j^W

h^

NG=not guilty
1).
To
GP=guilty plea
2).
To.
NC=no contest
3).
To.
AM=amended charge 4).
To.
BAIL: $
D Plea accepted
SENTENCING:
D Defendant waived t e for imposition
oi sentence
sentenc /
>sition p;
. for imposition/sentence/entrv of plea
D Case continued to
jail suspended on cond. of probation/or rme pvmt.
days in jail
.of fine and.
D 1. FineS
jail suspended on cond. ot probation/or tine pymt.
days in jail
.of fine and.
2. FineS
jail suspended on cond. of probation/or tine pymt.
days in jail
3 FineS
of fine and
Defendant to pay: • Victim reparation
Victim restitution S
• Drug testing
• Alcohol rehabilitation S
Other
$
Drug prevention .
D
Fine to be paid on or before.
Total Amount
(on monthlv payments of $ _
. to begin .
(or) as instructed by Adult Probation and Parole.
PROBATION:
D Defendant to be on probation for
months with • AP&P • Court D Unsupervised
Defendant to report immediateity to:
• Probation office, 150 East Center Street, Provo 374-7633
Review date
D Presentence
D Utah County Department of Substance Abuse, 100 East Center, Suite 3200, Provo, Utah 370-8427
Defendant to obtain an alcohol evaluation
Defendant is to complete classes as recommended
is to pay Utah County Substance Abuse directly
D Defendant
Utah State Fund to pay for evaluation/classes
• COMMITMENT: issued for
days. To be served by
in Utah County Jai 1775 South Dakota Lane, Provo
• WORK RELEASE:
Defendant may serve
hours community service
bv
. Contact: ACS Director, 150 East Center Street, Provo, 374 633.

TkUL.

!TiaU_

a
a
a
a

•

a

•

a
a
a

Bl

SP-AF0336

Sift^n

1

COURT G

GRHM

2
JAH
H

3

n raww'^

4
5
6
7

RANDY M. LISH (3823)
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS
Attorneys for Defendant
930 South State, Suite 10
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 224-2119

8

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

9

UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT

10

oooOooo

11
12

Plaintiff,

13

vs.

14

KOTUNG LEE,

15

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
OF COUNSEL

CITY OF OREM,

Case No.

52Lgl2d>

Defendant.

16

oooOooo

17

COMES NOW Randy M. Lish of the law firm of McCullough, Jones

18

and Ivins, and enters his notice of appearance of counsel for

19

Kotung Lee in the above entitled matter.

20
21

DATED this 10

day of January, 1992.
McCullough, Jones & Ivins

22
23
Randy «•. L i s h

24
25

1

26

f

v

~

a

27
28
MeCuilouqh, Jonas,
& Ivins
330 Soutn State St.
Suae 10
Orem Utan $4058
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT

CITY OF OREM
Plaintiff,
NOTICE OF SETTING
CASE NO. 921000023

vs
KOTUNG LEE
C/O RANDY LISH, ATTORNEY
930 SOUTH STATE, #10
OREM, UT 84058
Defendant,

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the above entitled case is set for
PRE TRIAL CONFERENCE , on the 10th day of February, 1992 at 9:30 A.M.
at the Fourth Circuit Court, Orem Department, 97 East Center, Orem
Utah, in courtroom #1.
Dated:

January 24, 1992

CHARGES:

RETAIL THEFT

Kristine Christiansen
Deputy Court Clerk
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Notice of Setting were
mailed, postage prepaid, on this 24th day of January , 1992 to the
following interested parties:
Orem City Attorney, 97 East Center, Orem, UT
Defendant,

84057

In care of counsel at the address above
Kristine Christianson
Deputy Court Clerk
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
Qjff.m
DEPARTMENT

LOG SHEET/MINUTE ENTRY
Case Number

/V-kj
Plaintiff

.^ '%pe_^5&d__
Clark
Date
,^ 7 0 • ^
Judge.

V.

Defendant

Counter* }

^ / / W ^ P ^

/

U <5h W

ii^.

Pit. Counsel.
Def. Counsel
Offense
It

C-^J^

Proceedings

^T
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&S

*ru i

^

#

9re - -hiAl
3-//)-<?,*-

"OURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UT*
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMEN
97 East Center Street, Orem, Utah

(801)226-6823
ATE vs.

KffcZ* l&e

e

ri 1-2 ^

Date
5-/4-.7JL
Clerk
&D-J+. Counter Number

Case/# __
judge
•Tin
Tape Number.

COUNTER
Hearing
Address

Charge #1

T

Charge #2
Charge #3
D
•
D
•
•
•
•
•
D

Current address has been verified with defendant
Defendant appeared Q Defendant failed to appear • Defendant in custody
B/W issued • Bail $
• Non-bailable D Plus $85.00 BW fee
Forfeit bail/bond
Clerk to renotice D Plaintiff to issue summons
Defendant given copy of information
Information read • Defendant advised to rights
Penalties explained • Defendant acknowledged (s)he understands rights, charge(s), penalties
Defendant was given 2nd and 3rd offense warning in opeRcourt.
*

1 7)C?^A/<±1-

Prosecutor
Defen$£ Attorney
• Request for counsel: • Granted • Denied
• Court appointed attorney: Contact
D City/Randy Lish - 930 South State, #10, Orem 224-2119
• State
• PLEA:
NG=not guilty
1)
To
GP=guilty plea
2)
To
NC=no contest
3)
To _ _
AM=amended charge 4)
To
BAIL: S
• Plea accepted

*L

Q Defendant Pro Se

^T

SENTENClTsJG:
Da Defendant waived time for imposition of sentence
for imposition/sentence/entry of plea
D J?ase continued to
G T l . Fine S <3(?f>
and 3Q days in jail. 5
ffrf) , of fine and 3 ^ 7 j a i l suspended on cond. of probation/or fine pymt
• 2. Fine S
and
days in jail. $
. of fine and
jail suspended on cond. of probation/oj^iiwe-pyrat
and
days in jail. 5
. of fine and
jail suspended on cond. of probation/jbrfine pymt
D 3. FineS
Defendant
to
pay:
D
Victim
reparation
D
Victim restitution 5 _
. D Drug testing
D Alcohol rehabilitation $
Other S
. D Drug preventoj
^3L Fine to be paid on or before.
. D Total A m o u n #
//^
(or) monthly payments of $ _
. to begin
(or) as instructed by Adult Probation and Parole.
PROBATION:
,
. S Defendant to be on probation for
^
months with Q AP&P QvCourt [^Unsupervised
Defendant to report immediatelty tot
D Probation oii'ice, 150 East Center Street, Provo 374-7633
Review date
• Presentence
Utah County Department oi Substance Abuse 100 East Center, Suite 3200, Provo, Utah 370-8427
Defendant to obtain an alcohol evaluation
Defendant is to complete classes as recommended
Defendant is to pay Utah County Substance Abuse directly
Utah State Fund to pay for evaluation/classes
COMMITMENT: issued for
days. To be served by
.in Utah County Jail 1775 South Dakota Lane, Pro'
WORK RELEASE:
hours community servi<
Defendant mav serve
Contact: ACS Director, 150 last Center Street, Provo, 374-7633
by

•
•

•
•

a
a
a
a
a
a

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
&r*srA.
DEPARTMENT

LOG SHEET/MINUTE ENTRY
Case Number _
Tape ffW* - / - ? 3

Clerk

fcOfcfr

Date X, r ? - / Q - ^ L
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L.ee^

/wrfi LWgf
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Pit. Counsel
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IN THE

COURT

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CITY OF Orem,

MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE

Plaintiff,

Date:

MARCH 10, 1992

vs.

Case No:

921000023

KOTUNG LEE,

Judge:

Joseph I. Dimick

Clerk:

RUTH D HUISH

Defendant.

Tape: 92123

MC

Count: 121

BENCH TRIAL
This case is before the court for TRIAL on the charge of
(1)

RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING)

(Class B Misdemeanor)

Appearing for the State is DON MCCANDLESS.
present.

The defendant is

Appearing as counsel for the defendant is RANDY LISH.

The defendant waives the right to be sentenced at the time
prescribed by statute.

1
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Orem Dept. - 4th Circuit Court
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

CITY OF OREM CITY
VS
LEE, KOTUNG
433 WEST 165 SOUTH
OREM
UT

84058

CASE NO: 921000023
DOB: 08/15/49
TAPE:
COUNT:
DATE: 03/10/92

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 76-6-602 RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING)
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty - Bench
Fine:
200.00
Susp:
100.00
Jail: 30 DA
Susp: 30 DA
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS!
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
Fine Description: Surcharge - 85%
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS:
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
CALENDAR:
TRIAL

ACS:

0.00

Due:

80.00

0.00

Due:

20.00

0.00

Due:

100.00

03/10/92 11:00 AM in rm 1 with Joseph I. Dimick

DOCKET INFORMATION:
Chrg: RETAIL THEFT
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be
Fine Amount:
200.00
Suspended:
100.00
Jail:
30 DAYS
Suspended: 30 DAYS
JID:RDH, DEF PRESENT WITH RANDY LISH. MCCANDLESS PRESENT FOR
CITY. CITY CALLS TWO WITNESSES. DEFENSE CROSS OF EACH. DEFENSE
CALLS DEFENDANT AS WITNESS. CITY CROSS. DEFENSE ARGUMENTS. CITY
REBUTTEL. RULLING: GUILTY AS CHARGED. TO FORFEIT BAIL IN
DISPOSITION. BALANCE TO BE RETURNED. EXHIBIT #1 MAY BE RETURNED
TO KMART AFTER 30 DAYS. CAULK GUN ORDERED RETURNED.

THE COURT
fs

/SAs

>

^<JLO&>£J

, CIRCUIT COURT
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN:
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.

